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the judicial campaign against polygamy
and the enduring legal questions
edwin B firmage

for lay people the chief virtue of our constitution

is not in its
distribution of power or in its guarantees of participation in governmental processes but in the protections it affords individual liberties
not least of which is freedom of conscience yet ratification of the bill
of rights did not fix in stone the content of constitutional guarantees
instead it was left to the judiciary to interpret the simple phrases of the
first eight amendments in concrete cases illuminated by evidence of the
framers intent and changing social values perhaps no provision of the
bill of rights better exemplifies this process of judicial interpretation
than the first amendments free exercise clause
mormans
monnons
Monnons
mons the seminal case
Mor
unfortunately for nineteenth century mormons
interpreting the free exercise clause reynolds vs united states came
early in the process reynolds upheld antipolygamy legislation against
cormons
cormons
the mormons
Mormons free exercise claims effectively ending the mormons
Mormons
efforts to obey both the laws of god and the laws of man and stunting the
growth of free exercise protections for generations in the years since
reynolds the supreme court has gradually evolved a more civil
libertarian view of the free exercise clause balancing free exercise
claims against the governments interest in regulating the particular
conduct in question but it has never completely abandoned reynolds or
its rationale and in its most recent decisions the court has shown signs
that it may be retreating to an earlier more restrictive view of first

amendment protections
EARLY JUDICIAL ATTACKS ON POLYGAMY

LDS church doctrine in 1852
officially acknowledged as part of
oflds
oflas

polygamy soon became a national issue but weak laws tenuous federal
control in utah territory and national distraction with other issues
firmage is a professor of law at the university of utah firmage writes 1 I acknowledge with gratitude
the help of my research assistants michael later and paul simmons in preparing this article this article is based
inzion in
upon a much more detailed account of the polygamy cases inzian
of the church
in the courts A legal history ofthe
odthe
buy
jesus christ oflatter
luy saints by edwin B firmage and R collin mangrum to be published in august 1988
of latter day
ofjesus
of fesus
by the university of illinois press
edwin

B

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1987

1

BYU Studies Quarterly, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1987], Art. 7

92

BYU studies

prevented effective enforcement of the antipolygamy laws until the
1880s congresss first attempt to deal with polygamy was the morrill
act it was not passed until 1862 ten years after the church first
announced its practice of polygamy and then went largely unenforced
for the next thirteen years at least four reasons explain why the
mormons
cormons were left in relative peace for so long first when polygamy
became an issue the nations energies were distracted by more pressing
problems the civil war and reconstruction the fight for national
survival forced the mormon problem to wait 2 second the handful of
federal officials in utah during the 1860s did not believe they possessed
the means to enforce compliance with the unpopular polygamy act this
attitude was not unfounded in 1863 the mere rumor that brigham young
was about to be arrested for polygamy provoked two thousand armed
mormons
mormans to assemble at his home to resist the arrest 3 third the feeble
monnons
federal control over utahs population was matched by nearly as feeble
control over the territorial government the governor and supreme court
justices were appointed by the president but the territorial legislature
and the bulk of the judiciary lay in mormon hands the legislature
expanded the powers of the judiciary by giving utahs probate courts
general jurisdiction over all civil and criminal cases allowing probate
judges to draw up jury lists and establishing a territorial marshal and
attorney with powers paralleling those of their federal counterparts 4
this rival mormon controlled judicial system with powers concurrent
with the federal judiciary tended to frustrate enforcement of the
antipolygamy laws finally the prosecution of polygamy was delayed
by defects in the statute itself polygamy under the morrill act was
subject to a three year statute of limitations so polygamists who eluded
prosecution for three years were free from peril furthermore the morrill
act required proof of multiple marriages creating almost insuperable
evidentiary problems 5
because of these problems the first attempts to prosecute polyga
palyga
mists were not brought under the morrill act at all in 1871 one thomas
hawkins was indicted for and convicted of having adulterous relations
with his polygamous wife 6 indictments immediately followed against a
number of leading church officials including brigham young under a
indicting
utah statute prohibiting lewd and lascivious cohabitation 7 by inducting
the churchs
churche leading figures the government sought to set a vivid
example for rank and file members paralyze the churche
churchs leadership
and cow the mormon populace into submission to federal policy during
the proceedings against brigham young judge mckean a rabid anti
mormon
monnon
mon
non declared
1

while the case at the bar is called the people versus brigham young its
garnic theocracy
polygamic
other and real title is federal authority versus Poly
the one government arrests the other in the person of its chief and arraigns
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it at the bar A system is on trial in the person of brigham young let all
concerned keep this fact steadily in view and let that government rule
without a rival which shall prove to be in the right 8

youngs trial was thus meant to crush at one blow the practice of
polygamy and the power of the church that rivaled federal authority
Mc
Keans plan was not to be realized however in clinton vs
mckeand
mckeans
englebrecht the united states supreme court ruled that in his efforts to
mormons and secure the conviction of
ofpolygamists
purge juries of cormons
polygamists judge
mckean had improperly ignored utahs jury selection procedures 9 As
a result of the decision in englebrecht hawkings
hawkinss
ss conviction for adultery
Hawkin
was overturned and the indictments against young and the others were
10
dismissed the prosecution of polygamy was thus halted until 1875 and
the reynolds case even after the reynolds decision upheld the morrill
act that statute remained constitutionally pure but practically worthless and only two morrill act cases ever reached the supreme court
THE REYNOLDS DECISION

george reynolds was an english immigrant private secretary to
12
young
polygamist
brigham
and a
in october 1874 he was indicted
under the morrill act 13 church historians maintain that reynolds began
as a test case designed to determine the constitutionality of the antipolygamy statute and that reynolds volunteered to test the statute and
cooperate in his prosecution in return for the governments agreement
14
monnon historians
non mormon
in
case
his
a
to
harsh
punishment
seek
not
155
ever
struck reynolds was duly convicted of
assert that no deal was
polygamy on the testimony of his polygamous wife but the case swiftly
became caught up in the sort of procedural pitfalls that had become
commonplace in utahs judicial system on appeal to the utah supreme
court reynolds argued that the grandjury
gran
granddjury
grandeury
jury that had indicted him had
been improperly constituted 6 the jury had been selected in accordance
with the newly enacted poland act which had limited the power of the
mormon controlled probate courts by changing the procedures for
selecting juries but which had not changed the number of jurors
required 17 the trial court em paneled twenty three grand jurors in accordance with federal practice utah law provided that a grand jury was to
be composed of fifteen jurors the utah supreme court reversed
reynoldsn
reynoldss
ss conviction because the trial court had followed federal rather
Reynold
than territorial law in fixing the size of the grand jury
in october 1875 reynolds was again indicted for violating the
morrill act this time in accordance with utah law the indictment was
cormons and eight
handed down by a grand jury of fifteen men seven mormons
mormons 8 however reynolds declined to cooperate with his own
non cormons
prosecution and his polygamous wife could not be found to testify
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against him the polygamous wife not being available the trial court
admitted her testimony from the previous trial into evidence 19 again
reynolds was convicted and sentenced to two years hard labor and a five
hundred dollar fine the utah supreme court sustained his conviction 20
this time reynolds argued that the trial court should have followed
federal law in setting the size of the grand jury since he had been indicted
under a federal statute the utah supreme court had little patience for
this change of tack and easily rejected the argument reynolds next
argued that potential jurors had been questioned improperly about their
personal attitudes toward polygamy but the court held that persons who
believed in or practiced polygamy could not be impartial jurors and thus
could properly be excluded the court ruled that prospective jurors
invocation of the fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination
evis cerated that
was equivalent to an admission of guilt and eviscerated
amendments protection the admission of the testimony of reynoldsn
reynoldss
Reynold
ss
21
wife
trial
was
likewise
first
at
the
deemed proper finally
polygamous
the trial courts instruction to the jury that it should consider what are
to be the consequences to the innocent victims of this delusion was held
22
to
prejudicial
be
not
the court likened the instruction to a mere
admonition that jurors should heed the law
with but one avenue of appeal remaining reynolds turned to the
united states supreme court 23 the supreme court affirmed the territorial courts rejection of
Reynold ss challenges to the grand jurys size
ofreynoldss
reynoldsn
reynoldss
improprieties injury selection admission of his polygamous wifes
cifes prior
testimony and prejudicial jury instruction but the bulk of the courts
opinion was devoted to reynoldss
reynoldsn
Reynold
ss claim that the trial court improperly
failed to instruct the jury that a finding that reynolds engaged in
polygamy as a result of a sincere religious conviction would justify his
acquittal reynolds argued that the first amendments guarantee of the
freedom of religion can excuse conduct that would otherwise be criminal the courts analysis of that issue made reynolds a landmark case
the court first attempted to decide what sense of the word religion
fell within the ambit of the constitutional provision that congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof finding no guide to the definition of the term
religion in the constitution itself the court turned to the writings of
madison and jefferson sources contemporary with the adoption of the
first amendment the court quoted from jefferson to the effect that
religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his god
the
legislative powers of the government reach actions only and not
opinions 24 adopting this demarcation the court concluded that
congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion but
was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or
subversive of good order 25

11
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in arriving at the conclusion that laws are made for the
government of actions and while they cannot interfere with mere
religious belief and opinions they may with practices 26 the court
grasped one half of a profound dilemma posed by the first
amendments protection of religion the court recognized that the
first amendment could not be read so broadly that any conduct asserted
to be an exercise of religion would be immune from state regulation 27
but the court wrongly concluded that because not all religious conduct
could reasonably be exempted from civil control no religious conduct
was protected by the first amendment by so concluding the court
ignored the express terms of the constitution which protect the
free exercise of religion 28 moreover the court overlooked the other
side of the first amendment dilemma religion is as much conduct as it
is belief the two cannot be disentangled it is with regard to those
religious practices offensive to the majority of a community that the
issue of freedom of religion arises in a democracy laws are most certain
to accord with the values of the majoritys
major itys religion it is the religious
practice of unpopular minorities that are most likely to be restricted by
the state and are thus most in need of protection the free speech clause
of the first amendment fully protects freedom of belief thus unless
the free exercise clause protects at least some practices that are offensive
to the majority that provision is devoid of any practical content yet the
foreclosed
closes such an application of the first
forecloses
reynolds decision fore
amendment
having established the belief conduct distinction and determined
that the first amendment was no bar to outlawing religiously inspired
conduct the court next concluded that polygamy was sufficiently
subversive of good order as to be properly made a crime this second
conclusion is also troublesome As linford notes the court never
quite explained why plural marriage was a threat to the public well
being 29 laurence tribe suggests that reynolds was wrongly decided
because the court overrode core personal rights of privacy and
religious expression for the sake of diffuse social goals 30 no victims of
reynoldsn
reynoldss
Reynold
ss conduct were produced it was conceded that polygamous
sects might be well ordered and the court never examined whether
polygamy degraded women instead the court found subversion of the
social order on the basis of an abstract syllogism that polygamy meant
patriarchy which meant despotism to avoid this amorphous social evil
the court invaded the right to religious freedom and limited the right to
marry a core element of per
sonhood in tribes words few decisions
parsonhood
personhood
better illustrate how amorphous goals may serve to mask religious
conviction was unanimously
persecution 31 nevertheless reynoldss
reynoldsn
ss
Reynold
fi nn e d 32
affirmed
af
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THE

prosecution OF cohabitation
UNDER THE EDMUNDS ACT

although the reynolds decision was a saddening blow to the
mormons
cormons
Mor mons the immediate impact of the decision was limited
reynolds established that congress had the power to punish polygamy
but the morrill act was a cumbersome weapon with which to do so
cormons would effectively resist
however the period in which the mormons
washingtons mandate was rapidly ending by 1880 the tone of
congressional debate indicated that the government not only had the
cormons
power to outlaw polygamy but also had the will to act the mormons
could no longer depend on isolation to ensure their neglect by
washington mining commerce migration and the transcontinental
railroad all brought the nation to utah while utah was far enough
mormon
monnon
non
from the seat of government that congresss knowledge of mon
society was mostly secondhand
second hand garbled and derived from biased
sources it was near enough to be a constant and growing irritation to a
low largely
nation that was rapidly spanning the continent and that was n ow
undistracted by more serious problems in a sorry cycle congress began
considering a series of more severe anti mormon bills in reaction not so
much to the offense of polygamy as to prior mormon resistance because
mormon church attempts to stamp out
polygamy was supported by the monnon
mormons
polygamy became attacks on the institution of the church and cormons
in general
in 1882 congress adopted the edmunds act which gave federal
officials an efficient weapon for the prosecution of polygamists 33
it created the new offense of unlawful cohabitation relieving
prosecutors of the burden of proving polygamous marriages allowed
lon charges and effectively
cohabitation
habitat ion
joinder of polygamy and co
cohabitant
cohabitat
mormans as jurors in polygamy cases the new law
monnons
eliminated all mormons
proved an effective tool in the hands of the churchs
churche opponents
convictions of polygamists went from one in 1875 to 220 in 1887 34 by
1893 after the church had renounced polygamy and prosecutions
largely ceased there had been 1004 convictions for unlawful
cohabitation and thirty one for polygamy 3515 the mere number of
polygamy and cohabitation convictions however understates the
impact of the raid on mormon society not just any mormon male
was allowed to practice polygamy only those who were morally
worthy and financially able were permitted to take plural wives thus by
mormons
and large the polygamists were also the cormons
Mormons leaders 36 the
conviction and imprisonment of polygamists served then to paralyze
mormon society by removing its leadership moreover many
polygamists who were not convicted were forced to go into hiding or flee
the united states
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the offense broadened

to

simplify polygamy prosecution the edmunds act provided
that men who cohabit with more than one woman would be guilty of
17
a misdemeanor 37
the act however did not say what conduct constituted
cohabitation nor does the congressional record offer any evidence that
congress considered the question the mormons
cormons argued that the benchmark of cohabitation should be sexual intercourse but such a definition of cohabit would have been undesirable in at least two respects
first proving sexual intercourse would be difficult if the morrill act had
proven ineffective because of the difficulties entailed in proving the
fact of marriage the edmunds act would be even more useless if proof
of cohabitation required proof of intercourse second to require
mormons
cormons to parade the details of their most intimate family life before
the courts would be an unendurable invasion of privacy but to accept
less intimate evidence as establishing cohabitation could remove all
standards for the determination of guilt
cohabits
the courts first confronted the issue of what constituted cohabita
tion in united states vs cannon angus cannon president of the
salt lake stake had married three wives prior to passage of the
edmunds act 39 two of these wives clara and amanda lived with him
in separate quarters in the same home the third lived in a house nearby 040o
cannon was indicted for cohabiting with amanda and clara after
passage of the edmunds act at trial cannon offered to prove that after
congress had passed the edmunds act he had told clara amanda and
their families that he did not intend to violate the law and thereafter did
not occupy the rooms or bed of or have any sexual intercourse with clara
but could not afford to provide a separate house for clara and her family
the court excluded the evidence as irrelevant and cannon was
convicted adhering to the churche
churchs direction to fight polygamy
prosecutions to the utmost cannon appealed to the utah supreme
court 41 his main objections were that all cohabitation which the law
deals with is sexual cohabitation of which he was innocent and that his
proffered evidence was wrongly excluded the court however rejected
this interpretation of the edmunds act it concluded that congresss
intent was to eliminate problems attending proof of polygamous marriages and that the pretense of marriage the living to all intents and
purposes so far as the public could see as husband and wife a holding
out of that relationship to the world were the evils sought to be
eradicated 42 proof of sexual intercourse was not necessary to make
out such an offense because the aim of the act was not to punish
mere sexual crimes 43 indeed the court reasoned that to construe the
statute as cannon urged would render the cohabitation offense
superfluous since other statutes already covered sexual offenses the
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court concluded that cohabitation meant dwelling together and not
sexual intercourse 44 the united states supreme court affirmed the
decision 45 adopting much of the reasoning of the utah court the
supreme court concluded that cohabitation was established if cannon
held the two women out to the world by his language or conduct or
both as his wives cannons agreement to abstain from sexual relations
with his plural wives was dismissed with the comment that compacts for
sexual nonintercourse
non intercourse easily made and as easily broken when the prior
are not a lawful substitute for
marriage relations continue to exist
the monogamous family which alone the statute tolerates 114646
on the whole the judicial refusal to make sexual intercourse the
test for cohabitation was sensible it is now an axiomatic standard for the
irreducible minimum of personal privacy that government has no
power to place spies in the bedroom 47 by construing the edmunds act
mormons an
to avoid that nightmare the judiciary at least spared the cormons
intolerable indignity and assault on their rights 4 8 the consequence
however was that proving cohabitation became ridiculously easy for
federal prosecutors As one scholar concluded to be tried was in
effect to be convicted 114949
the laws directive to mormon men to cease cohabitation meant
then that they must abandon their plural wives wives who had been
married decades before and who were now aged and infirm were to be
abandoned 50 younger wives were often to be left to support and raise
large families alone thus the moral posture of courts enforcing the
edmunds act was dramatically altered no longer did courts command
mormons
mormans to abandon a life of presumed debauchery since the sexual
monnons
activities of polygamists were legally irrelevant instead in the name of
mormons were called on to ignore the
amorphous social policies the cormons
moral obligations to support aging wives and raise innocent children
the judicial interpretation of the edmunds act simply failed to
mormons with any guidance as to how far obligations toward
provide the cormons
plural wives and children could be honored without violating the
mormons were thus presented with a
edmunds act 51 polygamous cormons
difficult decision morally they were obligated to associate with their
polygamous families to the extent necessary to provide for their welfare
but because the boundaries of legally permissible conduct had been left
undefined any contact potentially left polygamists open to prosecution
the facts of cannon indicate that cannon had genuinely attempted to
comply with the law yet after the court decisions it remained unclear
what he might have done differently to have avoided violating the law
it is a constitutional maxim that the terms
terins of the law must be sufficiently
clear that citizens may order their conduct in conformity with it 52 As
construed by the courts the offense of cohabitation was not so much one
mormons could not comply
of conduct as of appearance of course the cormons
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with a statute that made their conduct largely irrelevant and considered
only what they appeared to be or were reputed to be doing to make
cormons could not even
matters worse under subsequent decisions mormons
avoid prosecution by keeping the connections with their plural families
discrete A polygamist was required to separate himself entirely from
his polygamous women 53
As the pace of polygamy prosecutions accelerated the thought
occurred to some eager prosecutor that the cohabitation statute would be
more fearsome if every defendant faced not one cohabitation charge but
many such would be the case if each year month or day that a man
cohabited illegally could be the basis of a separate offense periods of
cohabitation could thus be divided into units as small as the prosecutor
wished allowing him to tailor the potential punishment to be meted out
to individual defendants solely at his discretion
A judicial test of this theory was attempted in the case of lorenzo
snow snow was charged with cohabitation in three separate indict
ments each one charging the same offense with the same women only
for different years in separate trials snow was convicted on each
indictment and given the maximum sentence for each conviction thus
by segregating the charges against snow the prosecution was able to
condic
triple his punishment the utah supreme court affirmed the convic
eions
tions 54 the only justification it advanced for allowing the prosecution to
segregate offenses according to time was a single massachusetts case
commonwealth vs connors which held that the maintenance of a
tenement for the sale of illegal liquor could be the basis for separate
convictions based on different periods of time 55 the united states
supreme court dismissed snows appeal on the ground that it did not
have jurisdiction to hear it since snow did not question the validity of the
statute but only its application 56 the utah supreme courts decision
dramatically raised the stakes in polygamy prosecutions by making the
penalty for cohabitation convictions far more severe moreover no one
knew how far the principle would be extended since the basis for
segregation was arbitrary in theory unlimited segregation was possible
with sufficient segregation cohabitation could become punishable by
lifetime imprisonment
with the principle of segregation having been approved by the utah
supreme court and the possibility of further review seemingly precluded
by the united states supreme courts decision in snow federal prose
cutors swiftly began expanding their use of the segregation of offenses
tutors
testing how far the principle could be pushed in united states vs
groesbeck the prosecution cut in half the period of each offense
charging the defendant with two counts of cohabitation one for each of
two six month periods unlike the snow case the trial of the two charges
was consolidated on appeal the utah supreme court sustained both
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these innovations 57 the court dismissed the argument that a single trial
of the defendant on both charges allowed the jury improperly to consider
groesbecks
Groes becks first conviction in determining his guilt on the second
charge the court noted that consolidation of offenses into a single trial
saved the state the burden and expenses and the defendant the harassment of multiple litigation in justifying the segregation of offenses the
court reasoned that to allow groesbeck to be charged with only one count
of cohabitation for his period of continuous cohabitation would be unfair
such a rule could allow more serious offenders to be treated more
leniently than lesser offenders for example a polygamist who ceased
cohabiting with his wives a year after the edmunds act was adopted but
renewed cohabitation after a year would be liable for two charges of
cohabitation whereas someone who cohabited with his wives throughout the same period would face only one charge similarly a rule that
allowed only one charge of cohabitation to be raised however long the
period of cohabitation had been provided polygamists with no incentive
conform
forin to the law for an individuals liability was not increased by
to con
his continuing to cohabit nor limited by his ceasing to do so
the courts reasoning is flawed at several points first under the
segregation rule there was no necessary relation between the length of an
offenders offense and the number of charges raised against him
because the basis of segregation was inherently arbitrary any offense
no matter how long or short its dura
duration
tion could be divided into as many
separate offenses as was desired snow for example had engaged in
polygamy for a period of forty years and was charged with three offenses
groesbeck on the other hand was assigned two thirds the punishment
given snow for a period of cohabitation of one year conversely if
cohabitation were treated as a continuous offense under the principles
governing the treatment of continuous offenses lapses in cohabitation
would not necessarily require separate offenses
meanwhile lorenzo snow had served his first six month sentence
he then applied to the united states supreme court for a writ of habeas
corpus claiming that his further detention was unlawful since the two
remaining sentences were the result of an unlawful segregation of a
single offense As before the government contended that the court
lacked jurisdiction but this time the court held that it had jurisdiction
not only had the court which tried snow no jurisdiction to inflict a
punishment in respect of more than one of the convictions but as the want
of jurisdiction appears on the face of the judgment the objection may be
taken on habeas corpus when the sentence on more than one of the
convictions is sought to be enforced 58

the courts opinion constituted a mild but clear rebuke to utahs
judicial officers for attempting to impose so patently offensive a device
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as the segregation of offenses cohabitation was the court stated
offense
inherently a continuous offence having duration and not an offence
consisting of an isolated act 59 indeed as the courts had defined
cohabitation it was an offense of reputation and appearance that made

ali but impossible any
ail
all
the identification of individual acts of cohabiting allbut
division of the offense into separate charges must be wholly arbitrary
leaving open to as many or as few divisions as the prosecution chose to
make it is to prevent such arbitrary conduct that the law provides that
inherently continuous offenses can be committed only once before
prosecution in short the court swiftly demolished the legal reasoning
of the utah supreme court in adopting the segregation principle
utah courts grudgingly bowed to the supreme courts decision
but implied that cohabitation offenses might still be divided where there
had been some breaks in the periods of cohabitation or where an accused
had more than two wives 60
even after in re snow courts could still impose multiple
punishments for what was in reality but one offense the edmunds
act specifically allowed polygamy and cohabitation charges to be
combined 61 because the definitions of the offenses were different a
man could be convicted of marrying a polygamous wife and then
convicted again for living with her 62 the supreme court set limits on
the combination of different offenses in hans nielsen 63 nielsen was
indicted for adultery and cohabitation both charges were directed at his
conduct with his polygamous wife caroline nielsen pleaded guilty to
the charge of cohabitation and was sentenced to three months imprisonment when arraigned on the adultery charge nielsen claimed his
conviction for cohabitation barred his further prosecution after serving
his sentence for cohabitation nielsen was tried and convicted for
adultery and sentenced to an additional 125 days imprisonment the
Niel sens petition for a writ of
united states supreme court granted nielsens
nielsene
habeas corpus
Niel sens convictions for both cohabitation and
in real terms nielsens
nielsene
adultery were manifestly improper for he was being punished for but one
offense having a polygamous wife legally though the elements of
the offenses differed so convictions for both offenses on the basis of the
same activity appeared permissible the court managed to arrive at a
sensible result it reasoned that proof that nielsen and caroline lived
together as husband and wife carried with it the assumption of intercourse that was the essential element of the adultery charge thus when
nielsen was convicted of cohabitation he was convicted of all the
elements of adultery and could not be separately punished for that
offense with hans nielsen attempts to make the polygamy laws more
savage by piling offenses together or fractioning a single act into many
separate offenses ceased
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the

evidence of cohabitation

the edmunds act prosecutions

saw a distortion of the rules of
evidence in part due to the same vindictive spirit that animated the harsh
application of the polygamy laws but in part the result of that same
vagueness and emphasis on appearance that afflicted the substantive
provisions of the edmunds act since the offense of cohabitation
consisted of ofappearing
appearing to consort with two or more women proof that the
accused had married either or both women was not necessary on the
other hand so long as a man cohabited with only one woman he would
seem to be in compliance with the law regardless of whether that woman
was the mans lawful wife thus a polygamist seemingly could abandon
his legally recognized wife live exclusively with a later plural wife and
not be guilty of cohabitation however a construction of the edmunds
act that allowed a polygamist to retain whichever one of his wives he
wished so long as he retained only one was of course notwell
weli received
weil
not well
by the courts 64 the judicial solution to this problem was a presumption
first announced in united states vs snow that a man cohabited with his
legal wife 65
to comply with the law lorenzo snow had set each of his older
wives up in a separate household and refrained from almost all contact
with them he lived solely with his last wife who still had infant children
to raise nevertheless he was convicted of cohabitation the utah
supreme court upheld the conviction not because he was cohabiting
with more than one wife but because he was with the wrong wife the
court reasoned that the edmunds act was intended like prior acts to
protect the institution of monogamous marriage and should be liberally
construed to achieve that intent to adopt a construction of the act that
allowed a polygamist to choose freely between his legal and his plural
wives was clearly offensive to the acts spirit thus the court presumed
that a man cohabited with his lawful wife at first this was offered as a
rebuttable presumption justified by societys
socie tys policy of encouraging
marital fidelity and by common experience as a factual generalization
the snow court still appeared to require at least some evidence of actual
cohabitation clever polygamists were able to get around the presumption by demonstrating that in their case it was incorrect thus courts very
quickly deemphasized the factual rationale for the presumption and
instead emphasized its legal and social policy rationale As they did the
strength of the presumption increased and the extent to which it could be
refuted by contrary evidence diminished 66
finally in 1888 the utah supreme court so diluted the amount of
evidence required to render the presumption of cohabitation with a
legal wife conclusive that in effect the presumption became a conclusive presumption of law in united states vs harris the court approved
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jury instructions to the effect that if the legal wife of the defendant lives
in the same vicinity with him bearing his name in a household maintained in part by him that is
absolutely and conclusively cohabitation
with his legal wife 67 under such a standard it seemed unlikely that any
polygamist could insulate himself from all contact with his lawful wife
sufficiently to avoid a finding of cohabitation certainly the presumption of cohabitation created a strong dis incentive for polygamists to
attempt to support and care for the women they had married conversely
harris provided some measure of relief to polygamists if cohabitation
with ones lawful wife was strongly presumed when you come to
cohabitation with the illegal wife then the presumptions are all against
it

1168
1568
68

the presumption of cohabitation effectively

shifted the burden of
proof in criminal trials in essence a polygamist was presumed guilty of
cohabitation unless he could prove his innocence
edse of the prosecutors task in proving cohabitation was
the ease
further enhanced by judicial rulings on the type of evidence that could be
admitted to establish cohabitation in united states vs snow the court
noting the strong legislative policy of stamping out all vestiges and
appearances of polygamy concluded that to achieve congresss goal
loose evidentiary standards were required
in these polygamic relations there never is and cannot be that
intimate association and habitual attention given by the man to the
various women as exist between a husband and his wife in the monogamic
state consequently in the very nature of things the proof of cohabitation
cannot be made as clear as in the case of a monogamic marriage
simply because the facts of which proof is to be made do not as abundantly
exist 69

circumstantial evidence such as language and conduct and appearances and expressions could serve as evidence of cohabitation 070 the
well or
fact that a man was seen watering his horses at a plural wifes
cifes
taking her provisions suggested an unlawful cohabitation 71 A birthday
party given for an aging polygamist and attended by his plural families
similarly indicated cohabitation 72 the net of circumstantial evidence
was spread even wider to include evidence of reputation 73 A few
cautionary voices however were raised the arizona supreme court
warned that evidence of reputation standing alone would amount to
nothing in such a case but in conjunction with all the other proof and
circumstances reputation could be considered by a jury 74 the idaho
supreme court went further and excluded evidence of reputation
altogether to assume the guilt without proof of the acts would be
manifestly improper 75
similarly evidence that the defendant had fled to avoid arrest was
deemed admissible as circumstantial evidence of guilt 76 for example in
O
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snow it was held that the jury in ascertaining whether the appellant was
guilty or not had the right to take into consideration his concealment at
the time of arrest and also the manner of concealment 77
be established by a presumption that he
if a defendants guilt could reestablished
beestablished
cohabited with his wives lawful and polygamous prosecutors first had
to prove that the defendant had married those women the same reasons
that made the morrill act nearly useless also made it difficult to prove a
marriage sufficiently to raise a presumption of cohabitation consequent ly courts lowered evidentiary standards allowing marriages to be
quently
proved by circumstantial evidence proof that two parties have treated
each other as husband and wife have lived together as such and have
held each other out to the world as such is sufficient to enable a court or
jury to find that at some previous time the parties did as a fact consent
to be married 78 in effect then the offenses of polygamy and cohabitation became identical in terms of the proof required for each each could
be proven by evidence that a couple associated so as to appear to be
married statements by a defendant that a woman was his wife made out
of court and before any charges had been made against him could be
trial to prove his marriage79
introduced attrial
at triai
marriage79 or to prove cohabitation 80 for
example in united states vs smith the defendant was convicted on
testimony that he had said we or they not positive which would
never give polygamy up that the law against it was unconstitutional
and that he had just as good a right to decide on it as the supreme
court 81 thus a rash criticism of supreme court decisions was transformed into an admission of guilt of cohabitation
finally cohabitation trials raised the issue of what time periods of
cohabitation could be shown to establish the offense conduct of a
defendant before enactment of the edmunds act in 1882 did not
constitute an offense and therefore should have been irrelevant in
cohabitation cases but courts admitted evidence of such conduct on two
theories the first rested on certain presumptions if a lawful relationship
was formed then subsequently made unlawful the law would presume
that the parties had terminated the relationship unless the contrary was
proved 8212 but polygamy had been unlawful the court pointed out since
the morrill act in 1862 and for more than a generation under common
law in the territory if an individual entered into an unlawful relationship
at any point in time the law would presume that the relationship
continued in the absence of evidence that it had ceased 83
the other rationale for allowing evidence of a defendants prior
conduct was less ambitious just as in a murder case evidence of how the
defendant behaved toward and felt about the victim before the murder
might be admitted evidence of how the defendant regarded his plural
wives before 1882 could be admitted to show how he regarded them at
the time of the offense 84 evidence of prior conduct was admissible not
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to show liability but merely to illustrate and explain the evidence as to
what took place during the time laid in the indictment 85 A defendants
cohabitation prior to passage of the edmunds act was evidence of his
propensity to violate the law and of his evil intentions As such the
evidence could be thrown in along with all the other circumstantial
evidence for the jurys consideration 86 however while evidence of
prior conduct as in a murder trial may be admitted to establish the
defendants motive or knowledge the evidence of prior conduct
admitted in the polygamy trials was not evidence of cohabitation
precisely the offense charged such evidence could only have prejudiced
or confused a jury making it likely that a defendant would be improperly
convicted on the basis of his prior conduct or that the jury would
improperly conclude that because the defendant had previously
cohabited he must have been guilty of cohabitation as charged
in loosening the rules of evidence to serve congresss policy
of ensuring the punishment of polygamy the courts undermined the
elemental bases of judicial procedure and due process of law the most
basic assumptions that an accused is presumed innocent and must be
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by competent evidence were
sapped of all strength the courts were indeed accurate when they
identified cohabitation as an offense of appearance or reputation for
accuse
accuseds
under such evidentiary standards an accusers
ds actual conduct seemed
mormans widely reputed to be polygamists through
monnons
largely irrelevant mormons
the use of strings of presumptions and the testimony of what people
thought their marital relations to be could be quickly convicted whatever
they tried to do
witnesses to cohabitation

to convict mormon men of polygamy offenses

certainly no more
effective and knowledgeable witnesses could be found than their wives
two obstacles however appeared to bar use of this pool of witnesses
first m any if not most mormon wives were unwilling to testify
against their husbands second even if they were willing to testify at
common law a person could not testify against his or her spouse
polygamy prosecutions raised perplexing problems for example did
this spousal disability apply to illegal polygamous wives if so what if
it could not be determined which was the lawful and which were the
plural wives the issues were first confronted in united states vs miles
the only other morrill act case to reach the united states supreme court
besides reynolds
from the evidence at trial it appeared that john miles had married
three women on the same day because miles was charged with bigamy
under the morrill act it was necessary to prove his marriages to the three
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women and therein lay the difficulty for the marriage ceremony was
shrouded in secrecy miless wife caroline however was willing to
testify against him 88 miles conceded his marriage to caroline but denied
his marriage to his first wife carolines testimony was essential to the
states case but if caroline was miless lawful wife under the common
law rule her testimony was inadmissible but her testimony helped
establish that at the time miles married her he already had a lawful wife
and if miles had a wife when he married caroline his marriage to her
was invalid and she was a competent witness
the trial court resolved this perplexing question by throwing the
whole matter to the jury caroline was allowed to testify at the end of
the trial the jury was instructed that only if they found that miles was
already married when he married caroline could they then consider
carolines testimony in determining whether miles was guilty of
bigamy the instruction of course was useless because tautological in
determining whether
yh ether carolines testimony on the issue of miless guilt
was admissible the jury necessarily had to determine the issue of his
guilt
on appeal the united states supreme court rejected the trial
labor saving device it concluded that a defendants
courts ingenious laborsaving
witness wife must be treated prima facie as his lawful wife as long as
the fact of the first marriage is contested the second wife cannot be
admitted to prove it 89 the principle behind this ruling was the old rule
that a witness that is prima facie incompetent cannot give evidence
to establish his competency and at the same time prove the issue 0 90 the
court reached this ruling with apparent regret for in doing so it
recognized that it was disabling almost all witnesses to polygamous
unions however the court recommended two escapes from this
predicament first eyewitnesses to a marriage were not necessary
polygamous marriages could be proven like any other fact by admissions of the defendant or by circumstantial evidence 91 second if under
existing laws it was too difficult to prove polygamy congress could
always change the law 92 because it was based on the testimony of an
incompetent witness miless conviction was reversed
miles did not end the issue of a wifes
cifes competency to testify against
her husband the general rule that a wife was not a competent witness
against her husband was subject under common law and the utah statute
to several exceptions A utah statute for example provided that a wife
could testify against her husband in a civil action by one spouse against
the other or in a criminal action for a crime committed by one against the
other 93 in united states vs bassett the utah supreme C
court
ourt concluded
that polygamy was in fact an offense by the husband against his lawful
wife more injurious to her than bodily injury thus the rule of spousal
disability did not apply and the wife was a competent witness 94
O
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again however the united states supreme court rejected the
territorial courts analysis 95 first the court concluded that the utah
courts had applied the wrong statute they had applied a statute found in
utahs code of civil procedure which adopted the common law rule of
spousal disability but expressly provided that the rule did not apply to
criminal actions for offenses committed by one spouse against the other
A second older statute contained in utahs criminal code provided that
a spouse might testify only in cases of criminal violence upon one
spouse by the other the court concluded that although the section of the
civil code was more recently adopted and would thus otherwise take
priority in fact the criminal code provision should have been applied
because bassett was a criminal case and polygamy could not rationally
be construed as an act of criminal violence less technically the court
concluded that even under the statute employed by the utah courts
polygamy could not be properly viewed as an offense against the wife
polygamy and adultery may be crimes which involve disloyalty to the
marital relation but they are rather crimes against such relation than against
the wife and as the statute speaks of crimes against her it is simply an
affirmation of the old familiar and just common law rule 96

decision
nearly seven years after the united states supreme court
courtdecision
in
mmiles
amiles
miles excluded the testimony of polygamous wives in polygamy trials
congress in the edmunds tucker act provided that a wife was a
competent witness in polygamy bigamy and cohabitation trials and
required that records be kept of weddings in the territories 97 these
provisions still retained one restraint on spousal testimony however
they provided only that a willing wife would be allowed to testify the
act specifically forbade attempts by the judiciary to compel wives to
testify against their husbands utahs judges did not always follow the
law however A number of mormon women were required to testify
against their husbands or face contempt charges 98 the power of
contempt could be a fearful weapon on the basis of the most sketchy or
nonexistent hearings mormon wives who refused to testify against
their husbands could be sent to prison for indefinite periods in 1888
theirhusbands
burnes read to the house of representatives a report by
representative bumes
a visitor to utahs prison
found in one cell meaning a cell of the penitentiary in utah 10 by 13 12
feet without a floor six women three of whom had babies under six months
of age who were incarcerated for contempt of court in refusing to acknowledge the paternity of their children when I1 plead with them to answer the
court and be released they said if we do there are many wives and
children to suffer the loss of a father 100
1I

judicial use of the contempt power in the polygamy cases thus
presented many mormon families with a cruel dilemma if the wife called
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as a witness submitted and testified her husband would almost surely be
convicted and imprisoned if she refused her husband might escape
conviction but the wife would be imprisoned at least one mormon
soh directed his wife to testify at his trial after she
husband rudger Claw
clawson
lol
iol
had spent a night in the penitentiary for refusing to do so 101
in retrospect it is difficult to offer any explanation for this judicial
ofvindictiveness
conduct toward mormon wives other than a spirit of
vindictiveness the
polygamy laws which were being vigorously enforced in the latter part
of the 1880s imposed ample punishment for the women who stubbornly
clung to polygamy the imposition of contempt sentences on wives who
refused to testify introduced a sort of random sexual equality in the
ygamy
agamy that was being imposed on utahs
federal punishment of pol
poi
polygamy
mormons
cormons
Mor mons courts had reduced the quantum of evidence required to
establish polygamy or cohabitation to such a low level that in almost any
case ample alternate sources of proof must have been available so
utahs courts could not have believed that they needed to compel
mormon women to testify in order to convict their polygamous
husbands the cohabitation cases produced heartrending stories of
suffering and pathos men were forbidden to associate with their children
or provide for their former wives women were denied care and association with former husbands moreover the law not limited to prohibiting
future polygamous marriages fell with all its severity upon people whose
relationships had most often been established when the law did not
unambiguously forbid them
THE VITALITY OF REYNOLDS TODAY

the legislative and judicial war on polygamy was ultimately
successful the church officially abandoned the practice in 1890
however the war was not without its casualties the courts decision in
reynolds was a good example of a situation where the social import of
the issue outstrips the political and legal resources of the time 102 the
courts overly restrictive view of the free exercise clause virtually read
it out of the constitution for over sixty years
reynolds continues to be cited as binding precedent today 103 but
beginning in 1940 in cantwell vs connecticut the court began to
qualify the belief action distinction that reynolds had established and to
redefine the scope of the free exercise clause 104 the cantwell family
jehovahs
hs witnesses had been going door to door playing an anti
Jehova
catholic recording they were convicted of soliciting religious
contributions without a state certificate and of breaking the peace
while maintaining the belief action distinction the cantwell court
rejected the implication of reynolds that religious conduct was
completely outside the protection of the first amendment the court
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stated that free exercise embraces two concepts freedom to believe
and freedom to act the first is absolute but in the nature of things the
second cannot be 0 105 yet the court recognized that the power to regulate
religious conduct could not be so exercised as to infringe unduly upon the
freedom of religious conscience cantwell required that statutes
regulating religious conduct be narrowly drawn so as to punish only
log
a
and
conduct
that
clear
present
was
specific
danger to the state 106 the
court reversed the convictions
welUs
in sherbert vs verner the supreme court followed Cant
cantwelus
weirs
cantwells
Cantwells
lead and further solidified the protection of conduct under the free
exercise clause 107 sherbert a seventh day adventist was discharged
by her employer and was unable to obtain other employment because she
would not work on saturday her claim for state unemployment
compensation was denied the court reversed extending free exercise
protection to a governments withholding of an economic benefit as
opposed to the governments imposition of a direct burden on religious
conscience
finally in wisconsin vs yoder the supreme court abandoned the
belief action distinction for a test that balanced the competing interests
surrounding the free exercise clause 108 in yoder amish parents objected
to the compulsory high school education of their children on the grounds
that exposure to modem values and advanced education would destroy
the insular society and simple lifestyle
life style that were essential to the amish
religion
in upholding the right of amish children not to attend high school
the court expressly rejected Reynold
reynoldsss proposition that the first
amendment was concerned solely with matters of belief suggesting that
matters of religious belief and conduct could not be meaningfully
separated into watertight categories the court recognized that its subsequent decisions had rejected the idea that religiously grounded conduct
is always outside the protection of the free exercise clause log109 to be
sure only conduct that is genuinely religious practice qualifies for first
amendment protection but genuinely religious conduct must be
afforded great deference by the state for a law restricting religious
conduct to stand there must be an interest of sufficient magnitude to
override the interest claiming protection under the free exercise
lio110 to determine whether a particular exercise is protected by
clause ilo
the first amendment the court balances the competing interests
applying this test the court conceded that the state interest in universal
education was compelling but concluded that compulsory education
beyond the eighth grade was an infringement of the free exercise of the
parents religious beliefs
of course it is a matter of speculation whether reynolds would
have been convicted had the court used a yoder type balancing test but
O
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had the government been required to show a compelling interest it would
have had to produce evidence of the social injury caused by
mormon
monnon
polygamy the evidence available today suggests that mon
non
polygamy neither caused or could cause the degradation of women and
children or the subversion of democracy 1 l even in the hard cases where
the first amendment has been invoked on behalf of unpopular religions
and practices such as people vs woody modem
modern courts have generally
accorded substantial deference to religious values 112 in woody a group
of navajos
cavajos asserted that the first amendment protected their use of
the hallucinogen peyote as a part of their religious services after a
careful assessment of the use of peyote in the defendants religious life
the california supreme court concluded that the states interest in
controlling drug use did not outweigh the claims of religious freedom
the so called compelling state interest in protecting the navajo from the
deleterious effects of the drug was dismissed with the comment we
know of no doctrine that the state in its asserted omniscience should
undertake to deny to defendants the observance of their religion in order
to free them from the suppositious shackles of their unenlightened
3
and primitive condition
the fair minded and tolerant attitude toward strange and unpopular
religions expressed by the court in woody is perhaps as important a
change from reynolds as is the new judicial doctrine expressed in yoder
the reynolds court directed much polemic against polygamy but made
no attempt to assess the religious significance of polygamy to mormon
doctrine and society or to weigh that practice against the states interests
the state interests invoked to justify its elimination appear untenable in
light of the analysis in yoder and woody the diffuse social interest in
preventing patriarchal family structures to preserve democracy based on
sociological theories is precisely the sort of general state interest that
was rejected in yoder and the paternalistic state interest in freeing
mormon women from their supposed domination is precisely the sort of
state interest that was rejected in woody
woody thus the developments of the
twentieth century have undermined the reynolds rationale
modern court has at times shown signs of
nevertheless the modem
backtracking from the sherbert yoder line of cases the vitality of yoder
was questioned just ten years after yoder in united states vs lee 114
lee like yoder an amish employed several other amish he
objected on religious grounds to paying the social security tax
imposed on employers the court purported to apply the yoder
balancing test but reached a different result from that in yoder in
rejecting lees claim to an exemption from the law the court tried to
distinguish yoder on the grounds that a tax system could not function if
exemptions were too easily granted on the basis of religious belief
whereas an educational system could presumably tolerate religious
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exemptions 115 justice stevens concurring in the judgment found yoder
indistinguishable the same religious interest was implicated in each
case and the state interest in yoder was no less compelling than
the federal interest in lee justice stevens argued that the courts
decisions rested on a different constitutional standard namely that a
person who objects to a valid neutral law of general applicability on
religious grounds should have an almost insurmountable burden of
demonstrating that there is a unique reason for allowing him a special
exemption he found yoder the principal exception to this rule the
majoritys
majoritys conclusion in lee he argued suggested that the court in fact
placed a heavier burden on the party challenging the law than yoder
16
116
would warrant 115
free exercise decisions since lee give credence to justice
stevenss interpretation of supreme court precedents and suggest that
the court is dissatisfied with thee sherbert yoder balancing test or at least
to the relative weights of the individual and governmental interests
involved sherbert and yoder would suggest that the thumb should be
17
side
the
of
balance
on the religious freedom
but while professing to
apply the sherbert yoder test the modem court has at times shown
unusual deference to the governments purported interests As a result
the court has reached some questionable results and has demonstrated an
inconsistency in its free exercise jurisprudence that threatens to undermine the civil libertarian approach of the sherbert yoder line of cases
in jensen vs quaring the court considered a free exercise
that drivers licenses include a
challenge to nebraskan
Ne
nebraskas
braskas requirement
photograph of the licensee 8 mrs quaring objected to the requirement
as it was applied to her on the grounds that her religious beliefs prohibited
the use of her photograph the state failed to provide any evidence that
its interests would be harmed if it provided an exemption for those
opposed to photographs on religious grounds as yoder would seem to
9
yet
some
nonreligious
exemptions
state
the
provided
require in fact
the court barely upheld mrs quarings
Qua rings free exercise challenge
affirming by a four to four vote the eighth circuits conclusion that
phot oless drivers license
nebraska had to provide her a photoless
120
roy
vs
a
bowen
was
in
faced
court
question
with
similar
the
the parents of a native american brought an action challenging on first
amendment grounds the requirement that recipients of certain welfare
benefits provide a social security number the parents claimed that use
of a social security number for their daughter would violate their
religious beliefs they sought and obtained in the lower court an
injunction preventing the government from 1 making any use of their
daughters social security number and 2 denying their daughter
welfare benefits because of the parents refusal to furnish her social
12
security number to the state agency administering the welfare plan 121
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when the case reached the supreme court it generated five
separate opinions the court in an opinion by chief justice burger
easily rejected the first provision of the injunction the court stated that
the free exercise clause was meant to protect individuals from certain
forms of governmental compulsion it does not afford an individual a
right to dictate the conduct of the governments internal procedures
eight justices agreed that once the government had the number it could
use it as it wished in conducting its own internal affairs 122 because the
government already had the daughters social security number and could
use it however it saw fit justices blackmun and stevens saw no reason
to reach the constitutional questions presented by the second part of the
injunction six of the remaining justices however reached the issue of
whether the government could withhold welfare benefits to someone
who refused to furnish a social security number for religious reasons
with very different results 12123 the chief justice joined by justices
rehnquist and powell drew a distinction between governmental
compulsion and conditions relating to governmental benefits 24 the
chief justice expressly rejected a yoder type balancing test where the
challenged governmental action did not inescapably compel conduct
that some find objectionable for religious reasons 1112125 in the absence of
proof of a discriminatory intent he would uphold a neutral and uniform
requirement for governmental benefits if it was merely a reasonable
means of promoting a legitimate public interest 12626 under that standard
aroy
in roy
the chief justice would have upheld the entire statutory scheme mroy
on the other hand justice oconnor dissenting in part and joined by
justices brennan and marshall found that the chief justices proposed
test had no basis in precedent and relegates a serious first amendment
value to the barest level of minimal scrutiny that the equal protection
clause already provides justice oconnor would have applied our
long line of precedents to hold that the government must accommodate
a legitimate free exercise claim unless pursuing an especially important
121
interest by narrowly tailored means 127
under this yoder type of
121
analysis she would have upheld the second part of the injunction 128
despite indications in lee and roy that at least some members
of the court were ready to abandon the sherbert yoder balancing test
in hobbie vs unemployment appeals comm n the first free
exercise case to reach the rehnquist court the court strongly reaffirmed
121
Ms hobbie like
sherbert only chief justice rehnquist dissented 129
Ms sherbert was a seventh day adventist who was denied unemployment compensation when she lost her job for refusing to work on
saturdays the state tried to distinguish sherbert on the grounds that
hobbie had recently converted to her religion and expected her employer
to accommodate this change whereas sherbert had not a distinction
justice scalia suggested that one would only make if one did not like
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130
133
to
with
begin
sherbert
the court rejected the distinction pointing
out that it would single out the religious convert for different less
favorable treatment than that given an individual whose adherence to his
13
131
or her faith precedes employment
the state also argued for the less
rigorous free exercise test that chief justice burger had suggested in roy
but the court firmly rejected the argument the court reaffirmed that
when the state denies an important benefit because of conduct mandated
by religious belief the denial must be subjected to strict scrutiny and
can be justified only by proof by the state of a compelling interest 132

the belief conduct distinction of reynolds

has been jettisoned
jetti soned by
later cases substantial protection of religious practice as well as belief
is now accepted under the free exercise clause because belief has long
been protected under the speech clause this development is logical
historically correct and beneficial to society to avoid redundancy the
free exercise clause must be interpreted as protecting religious conduct
as well as belief nevertheless it would be unrealistic to expect a
supreme court as socially conservative as this or for that matter any
court likely to exist in the near future formally to overturn reynolds and
sanction the practice of polygamy 133 nor for that matter would it be
likely that the mormon church would ever again enter into that practice
even if thelaw
the law permitted it what should be expected however is that
thelah
the emergence of the free exercise clause as a vibrant base for civil
libertarian protection of rights of conscience under sherbert and yoder
will be strengthened and expanded any tendency toward erosion of the
free exercise protection should be stoutly resisted
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